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Deep and continuous palliative sedation (terminal sedation):
clinical-ethical and philosophical aspects
Abstract
Terminal sedation continues to fuel debate. When confronted with a patient for whom terminal sedation
is considered a possible treatment option, decision making can be difficult. In this paper we focus on the
clinical-ethical issues, with an aim to provide clinicians with ways of framing the issue from an ethical
point of view. In addition to the clinical-ethical issues, terminal sedation touches upon interesting and
complex questions of an essentially philosophical nature. What it means to be a "person" is one such
question, and is a topic that is relevant to clinical, daily practice. Accordingly, in the latter part of this
paper we draw briefly on selected philosophical positions to elucidate this question. A doctor's belief of
what it means to be a "person" might well affect their actions. For example, if a doctor believes terminal
sedation involves the destruction of the person, they might not be willing to proceed with it.
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ABSTRACT:
Terminal sedation continues to fuel debate. In this paper our focus is a clinical-
ethical one. By that we mean that our normative reflections should be seen in the 
context of applied ethics. Thus our primary aim is to provide clinicians with ways of 
framing the issue from an ethical point of view. Hopefully, that will also be of some 
help in their decision making when confronted with cases in which terminal sedation 
is considered a possible treatment option: what does going ahead, or not going 
ahead, with terminal sedation in particular patients look like ethically speaking? At 
the same time, terminal sedation touches upon interesting and complex questions of 
an essentially philosophical nature. Certain of those, such as what it means to be a 
“person” is a topic that is relevant to clinical, daily practice as well. Accordingly, in 
the latter part of the paper we draw briefly on selected philosophical positions in 
order to elucidate that very question. A doctor’s way of answering it to himself may 
impact upon his actions too. For example, if he thinks terminal sedation entails the 
destruction of the person, he might not be willing to perform it. 
Search strategy and selection criteria
Literature for this interdisciplinary Personal View was identified in two different 
ways. The medical literature through PubMed, using the search terms "terminal 
sedation" and "palliative sedation". Only papers published in English and German 
between 1991 and 2008 were included. The philosophical literature concerns the 
terms "person" and "personhood", and it cannot be searched in a similar way as most 
of the relevant literature is printed in books, including classics published several 
centuries ago, and was therefore found by hand. Of these we made a selection of the 
works of certain central thinkers in the Western tradition, mainly for illustration.
  
1
Introduction
Only in the last decade or so, palliative medicine has come a long way when 
it comes to symptom control at the end of life. Nonetheless, some terminally 
ill patients do experience suffering that is hard to control or even is 
refractory to conventional therapies. In situations like this, and presuming 
the necessary resources as well as the required skills and training in doctors 
are in place, patients can be offered a treatment strategy traditionally known 
as “terminal sedation” (TS). However TS has aptly been described as 
“source of a restless ethical debate”. (1) We now turn to certain aspects of 
that debate.
Terminal sedation, palliative sedation (PS), palliative sedation therapy 
(PST)
The concept terminal sedation was coined by Enck in 1991. (2) But later on, 
several authors have expressed dissatisfaction with it, mainly because it may 
leave the impression that the aim of the sedation is to (intentionally) produce 
death. (3) Since it is not – save, obviously, for in cases of misuse such as 
intentional overdosing (“slow euthanasia”) (4, 5) – but is about attempting to 
relieve or palliate unusually difficult symptoms, some have argued that the 
term “palliative sedation” (PS) is more appropriate. This concept appears to 
have been first introduced in a scientific paper in June 2000. (6) In 2001, it 
was also called “palliative sedation therapy” (PST). (7) Subsequently, others 
have followed and defended the usage of palliative sedation (therapy) as the 
most illuminating term. (8, 9) Other terms in the same vein have also seen 
the light of day, among which we find “sedation for intractable distress in 
the dying” (10) and “end-of-life sedation”. (9) 
Globally, there exist different sets of guidelines for PS. Those of the 
Norwegian Medical Association (NMA) are among the most detailed. The 
NMA defines PS as “pharmacological depression of the level of 
consciousness in order to alleviate suffering that cannot be relieved in any 
other way.” (11, 12) 
To fix ideas, it may be helpful to follow de Graeff and Dean, who 
distinguish between various levels of PS – which they call PST – at the end 
of life (panel 1): (9)
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Panel 1. Three levels of palliative sedation therapy (PST)
• Mild (somnolence): the patient is awake, but the level of 
consciousness is lowered
• Intermediate (stupor): the patient is asleep but can be woken to 
communicate briefly
• Deep (coma): the patient is unconscious and unresponsive
Palliative sedation: deep and continuous (DCPS)
As far as the last category is concerned, sometimes there are good clinical 
reasons for choosing this radical solution. It could be that the less invasive 
approaches (mild and intermediate) will not do in bringing the suffering to a 
level that is acceptable to the patient. 
Nonetheless, since the patient’s situation sometimes changes 
somewhat for the better, there is the possibility that the artificially induced, 
deep unconsciousness could be discontinued. However some attempts at 
discontinuance are going to fail since bringing the patient to the surface 
again may sometimes result in renewed extreme suffering. Hence, states the 
NMA, “if it becomes clear during the wakening process that the patient’s 
situation is still intolerable, it is justifiable to increase sedation without the 
patient regaining consciousness.” (11, 12) 
Furthermore, such wakening runs the risk of disrupting a fragile 
steady state that could be difficult to achieve again (9) and this risk may 
sometimes be judged to be too high. 
Thus there is a rationale for, occasionally, keeping the patient in the 
artificially induced coma – accepting such treatment, in the words of 
Margaret Battin, as the least worst death in the given situation (13). 
Accordingly, this form of PS will be both deep and continuous – hereafter 
DCPS for short. 
DCPS and quality of life
Now at least from a patient’s perspective it might make little difference 
whether one is dead, or continuously unconscious from a given point in time. 
(14) To take out consciousness “for good” is an absolute curtailment of 
personal freedom. (3) The patient is no longer able to make autonomous 
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choices or experience the world around him, nor is there any contact with his 
next-of-kin. 
The patient’s life is now purely biological, hence he is alive but 
without a social life. Within palliative medicine, quality of life is a key value 
as well as paramount in all treatment measures. But in what sense could 
DCPS in the dying be said to promote their quality of life when they can no 
longer experience life? (3) This state has also been described as “social 
death”. (9) 
DCPS and autonomy
In DCPS the patient loses his autonomy. Now respect for autonomy is also a 
key value within palliative medicine. Does this mean that value too is 
somehow rejected or violated? We think not, based on the following 
reasoning. 
An autonomous (competent) patient’s decision-making capacities 
are respected when he is given the opportunity to consent to or reject DCPS 
– notwithstanding the fact that probably most patients eligible for such 
treatment will be unable to exercise their autonomy due to disease-induced 
and/or drug-induced, severe cognitive impairment. The setting aside of 
autonomy comes in after such consent has been given. That is to say, the  
value of being able to exercise autonomy is completely left behind, as it 
were, as one is not in a position to uphold that value subsequent to the 
initialisation of DCPS. And so the patient has autonomously chosen not to 
be autonomous anymore; that is the price he is willing to pay in exchange for 
a tolerable situation.
The question remains, though, to what extent this can be an 
autonomous choice in the patient, even when he is cognitively intact – that 
is, in what sense he can be said to be exercising his free will in so doing. If 
the physical suffering is so extreme, it would seem that there is no other 
choice than DCPS. 
There is also the issue of the ethics of autonomously deciding to be 
nonautonomous. It is regularly invoked against euthanasia that destroying 
one’s autonomy by exercising that very autonomy entails a contradiction. (3) 
But if it does, this argument appears to apply to DCPS as well. 
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Hastening of death/shortening of life
A study published in 2007 that is a systematic review of the literature 
performed by an international panel of 29 palliative care experts, concludes 
that retrospective studies strongly suggest that appropriately used in the very 
last days of life PS does not shorten life. (9) But even if it does – and this 
could somehow be demonstrated, either in individual cases or statistically – 
the Doctrine of Double Effect could provide ethical justification for this. 
(15) 
It has been claimed – and very many take this view – that for PS to 
be initiated, “the disease should be irreversible and advanced, with death 
expected within hours to days”. (9) But whence this limitation? Why exclude 
those with a somewhat longer life expectancy? Can one justify not helping 
patients who suffer terribly on the grounds that they are too far away from 
the moment of death? One standard counter-argument is that if extended 
beyond a few days, there is going to be an increased risk of life-shortening 
when PS is applied – in particular when hydration is withheld during DCPS: 
“One of the most difficult situations is where deep, permanent sedation is 
given to a patient who is expected to survive for more than one week. Some 
would argue that, in this situation, dehydration may hasten death.” (9) That 
sounds a bit weak, however. Not executing hydration in such a patient for 
several weeks, say, not only may but will shorten life. 
But many other end-of-life non-treatment decisions (NTDs) – such 
as withdrawing aggressive chemotherapy or withholding radical surgery – 
also entail the risk of, and sometimes the certainty of, life-
shortening/hastening of death. When hydration in DCPS is deemed futile, it 
would seem you simply have a combination of two end-of-life decisions; 
DCPS plus an NTD. Together these do not constitute euthanasia – which we, 
following what has become the international convention, understand as the 
administration of drugs by a doctor with the intention of ending the patient’s 
life at his/her voluntary and competent request. (11, 16, 17) Nor would it be 
euthanasia according to Dutch or Belgian law. (18, 19) 
Nevertheless, some will claim that when life-shortening is a likely or 
expected consequence, it would still be to intentionally hasten death through 
an NTD. Others are uncomfortable with that kind of language, and insist on 
calling this “not prolonging dying”.
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Euthanasia instead of DCPS?
Since the person is already “gone” in DCPS, an argument that springs to 
mind is that it would be more rational to perform assisted suicide or 
euthanasia – hereafter: “voluntary assisted dying” (VAD) to cover both – in 
such patients instead of DCPS. This solution would save a lot of healthcare 
workers’ time and energy, as well as resources, and spare family members 
the waiting period. 
But legalising VAD is a much wider topic that cannot be confined to 
end stage diseases in which DCPS may be appropriate. The topic would 
include issues like VAD at much earlier stages of the disease trajectory, in 
the chronically ill and in psychiatric patients, or even in those who have no 
serious illness of any kind but who are simply “tired of living”. (20) In fact, 
it may well be that the wider range of VAD compared with DCPS, which is 
mainly due to technical differences and to the more medicalised context of 
DCPS, also constitutes the main ethical difference between these two areas. 
Nonetheless, where either one, or both, of the two types of VAD is legal or 
legally condoned – the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Oregon (21, 
22, 23) – the question posed seems relevant. It might even sometimes be 
pressing. 
DCPS is terminal sedation in its proper sense 
Palliative care practitioners are sometimes confronted with the claim that 
ethically speaking, what they do bears an important resemblance with VAD, 
namely that “the first value held in common is a focus on the importance of 
reducing human suffering”. (24) But it is not intelligible to say that the 
induction of death through VAD “reduces” suffering: it ends it. (3)
Still, this counterargument does not fully hold true for DCPS. Not 
the patient’s biological life, but at least his social life comes to an end. In 
that respect, this treatment strategy has an unclear border with euthanasia. 
Against this backdrop, the term PS may be seen as a misnomer when 
the treatment is executed in its most radical form: DCPS. To palliate means 
to relieve, alleviate, or ease. But when the sedation is so deep that it takes 
out awareness of absolutely all symptoms on a permanent basis, palliation of 
symptoms is not really taking place. It is more of an eradication of 
symptoms – which happens when euthanasia is performed too.
Note that when we here speak of the “permanent” taking out of 
consciousness, this does not mean permanent in the sense irreversible. It 
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would be reversible, but sometimes only at high costs – or it may not be 
feasible at all. Permanent unconsciousness is therefore, in these instances, 
the end outcome of the entire DCPS process; in reality, it turned out to be 
permanent (although not so by nature).
It is our view that as far as DCPS is concerned, Enck’s original 
concept of TS (2) is more adequate than the newer, and more and more 
commonly used, PS. These patients are actually terminally sedated since 
DCPS constitutes the closing, or the concluding, of the patient’s social life. 
This is obvious when the patient’s next-of-kin are asked to say goodbye to 
their loved one, who is now about to be sedated in such a way that there is 
no intention whatsoever of ever “bringing him back” before he dies. One 
internationally renowned palliative care physician who has been involved in 
such situations several times, once told one of us (LJM) in a personal 
communication that confronting both patients and relatives with this is 
“absolutely terrible”.
It is vital to underscore that even though it is here the intention that 
the patient shall never again regain consciousness (a decision that may 
nevertheless be reversed), this does not mean death itself is also intended or 
sought. The intention is, like before, that the patient be freed of intolerable 
suffering as life draws to a close. True, doctors and others might wish or 
hope that death in this patient comes sooner rather than later. But wishing is 
not intending: if a person is in need of a heart transplant, say, he would wish 
that some compatible donor will die shortly but in no way has he thereby 
intended (so as to produce) that someone’s death. (3) Intentions reflect inner 
mental states, including motives that result in particular acts of commission 
or omission. That is why acts are called ‘intentional’ in the first place. Not so 
with wishes, and therefore an intention should not be likened to a wish, from 
which there follow no acting (be it active or passive).
For the other two levels, however, PS is the more appropriate term 
still (panel 1).
DCPS and personhood: some philosophical reflections
As outlined above, practicing physicians basically tend to think of palliative 
sedation in terms of proportionality (type and extent of symptoms, life 
expectancy, level of sedation), of intention (double effect) and, when 
appropriate, of consent. Within this framework, there is widespread 
agreement that DCPS is morally acceptable as long as the decision to carry it 
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out is clinically proportionate, the decision is in accordance with the 
patient’s wish or presumed wish, and the doctor has no intention to shorten 
the patient’s life.
However, beneath such more practical parameters – all of which are 
subject to interpretation – there sometimes lurk deeper philosophical 
questions. One of these that is crucial for DCPS is the question of 
personhood. Since DCPS turns the patient into “a living dead”, some would 
want to claim that he is no longer a person – that as a person (although not as 
regards his basic vital functions) he has in fact been “killed”. 
At face value, this seems to be true. And for all practical purposes, it 
appears to be so too; no one will ever again come into contact with the 
person he was. That notwithstanding, most health care workers will probably 
think differently and would also take patients in a PVS to be persons. It has 
also been pointed out that nurses in an ICU even treat dead patients as 
persons. (25)
From a philosophical point of view the answer to the question, “does 
DCPS entail the “killing” of persons?”, would, among other things, turn on 
what one thinks constitutes personhood (table 1) – one of the most contested 
subjects within philosophy. 
Table 1. Personhood and DCPS
Philosopher René Descartes John Locke Immanuel Kant John Harris
Concept of 
personhood
Thinking 
substance: 
Cogito, ergo 
sum
Ability to 
think and 
self-
awareness 
“over time”
From conception 
until death
Capacity to 
value own 
existence
Consequenc
e: Does 
DCPS entail 
ending 
(“killing”) of 
the person?
Yes Yes No No
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Figure 1: René Descartes (1596-1650): “I think, therefore I am” – the essence of 
personhood.
French mathematician and rationalist philosopher René Descartes 
(1596-1650) is famous for his Cogito, ergo sum – “I think, therefore I am”. 
(26) When put in the state of DCPS, I am no longer able to think; I stop 
being what Descartes calls “a thinking substance”.Thus, on the Cartesian 
model, it would seem that I am therefore not (any more); the “I”, and eo ipso 
the person, gets extinguished. 
Figure 2: John Locke (1632-1704): A 
person is an individual who is able to 
think and has self-awareness “over 
time”. 
English physician and 
philosopher John Locke (1632-
1704), one of the great 
empiricists, saw the ability to 
think combined with self-
awareness “over time” as the 
essence of personhood. One of 
Locke’s definitions of the term 
“person” is as follows: “a 
thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it 
self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it 
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does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as 
it seems to me essential to it”. (27) The Lockean model thus appears to 
generate the conclusion that DCPS does indeed entail the “killing” of 
persons; the ability to think is gone, and during the time left to live there is 
no self-awareness.
Figure 3: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): We are persons from conception until death. 
According to German physicist and philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) we are persons from the very beginning of our biological lives: 
“the offspring is a person, … from a practical point of view it is a quite 
correct and even necessary Idea to regard the act of procreation as one by 
which we have brought a person into the world without his consent and on 
our own initiative”. (28) 
The way Kant sees it, human beings consist of, first, what he calls an 
“empirical” ego. This ego is the equivalent to the body, and like all other 
things in nature our body is subject to the laws of nature. But there is more 
to man than meets the eye. For we also have a “transcendental” ego, which is 
the rational part of man. Our rationality – from the Latin ratio; reason – is, in 
contradistinction to bodily processes, subject to the laws of logic. (29) 
Now DCPS only affects the empirical “me” (i.e. the body) so that I am no 
longer able to act rationally – it does not take away the capacity to so act. 
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Thus in DCPS I am still a person; I am still “there”. On this reading of Kant, 
the claim that DCPS amounts to “killing” persons can hardly be sustained.
British contemporary philosopher and medical ethicist John Harris 
holds: “The individual can be said to have come into existence when the egg 
is first differentiated or the sperm that will fertilise that egg is first formed. 
This individual will gradually move from being a potential or a pre-person 
into an actual person when she becomes capable of valuing her own 
existence. And if, eventually, she permanently loses this capacity, she will 
have ceased to be a person.” (30) 
In this conception – as opposed to in Kant’s – an individual is 
distinct from a person. The latter simply does not last as long as the former. 
It would also be possible to be an individual solely; a severely brain 
damaged child that is unresponsive to its environment might well lack 
personhood altogether. Nonetheless, here too an individual undergoing 
DCPS would still be a person since the particular “capacity” mentioned by 
Harris is intact. 
DCPS and psychological and existential suffering 
The international panel of palliative care experts referred to above writes that 
“psychological and existential distress as an indication for PST is a 
controversial issue”, and goes on to say that it believes PST in such cases 
“should be initiated only under exceptional circumstances.” (9) – although it 
is not explained what is meant by this. 
In this area there are important cultural differences that impact on 
clinical practice. Within Spanish palliative care, sedation for reasons other 
than the management of purely physical symptoms is a common occurrence. 
Thus, “psychological distress due to the peculiar cultural way of coping with 
terminal disease in Spain, where denial and rejection of diagnosis disclosure 
are prevalent, is at the heart of this situation”. (31) Accordingly, 
“unconsciousness, either disease-induced or drug-induced, is generally 
perceived as the “best way out”, especially when patients are aware of their 
prognosis” – very many are not, nor are they being told – “and regardless of 
whether life is shortened by the use of these drugs”. (31) 
Now according to the international panel, “intolerable suffering is 
determined by a patient as a symptom or state that he or she does not wish to 
endure.” (9) Equipped with a subjective definition of intolerable suffering 
like that, it appears contradictory to simultaneously restrict access to DCPS 
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in those whose suffering is primarily psychological or existential, save for 
“only under exceptional circumstances.” (9) 
Possibly, the answer to what seems at first sight to be a contradiction 
lies in an aspect that has not been brought up by the panel itself, namely the 
question of whether it is justified to view existential suffering as a symptom 
or medical state? Put otherwise: is a highly invasive pharmacological 
intervention like DCPS in order to combat such suffering really within the 
domain of what doctors should be doing? Some will say this does not have 
anything to do with medicine. Or, at least it goes far beyond medicine and 
hence there can be no medical treatment of it.
In light of that question, charging palliative care with the task of 
finding a medical response to existential suffering could be seen as an 
extreme medicalisation of dying. In his famous polemic Medical nemesis, 
Vienna-born theologian and philosopher Ivan Illich sharply criticised the 
trend of modern societies to expect the answer to more and more societal 
challenges to come from medicine and doctors. (32) His charge of creeping 
medicalisation has also been levelled at palliative care. (33) Institutions that 
feel responsible for any aspect of the patient could sometimes be tempted 
also to control any aspect of the patient, a risk already pointed out in 1961 
by sociologist Erving Goffman. (34) Since then, the question of how 
hospitals, hospices and nursing homes can successfully prevent the risk of 
becoming “total institutions” has been subject of a continuing debate. (35) 
Here is an interesting parallel with VAD for those “tired of living” 
(20), something that also entails an enormous extension of medicine’s 
domain as well as representing the involvement of doctors in a field many 
would think they should have no role whatsoever. (21)
Nevertheless, acknowledging that the relief of existential suffering 
goes beyond DCPS does not answer the question of what should be an 
adequate response to this type of suffering. One recently developed approach 
that is concerned, among other things, with existential suffering is so-called 
“Dignity Therapy”. (36) This intervention is depicted as “being able to 
bolster a sense of meaning and purpose while reinforcing a continued sense 
of worth within a framework that is supportive, nurturing, and accessible, 
even for those proximate to death”. (36) This far, Dignity Therapy has shown 
itself to be a promising non-medical intervention at the end of life.
Concluding remarks
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DCPS is a problematic treatment strategy for a number of reasons clinical, 
ethical and philosophical. On balance, however, it is our view that it 
sometimes should be carried out. But on what indications DCPS should be 
given remains controversial. Whatever these are taken to be, we think 
doctors should always perform this particular treatment with a certain 
amount of reluctance. They should vigorously explore what alternatives 
there might be, including various sorts of psychological and existential 
support. That way DCPS is more likely to be a truly last-resort measure – 
one that the doctor is sorry to have to apply, but at the same time is glad to 
be able to.
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